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HOLDING THE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTABLE  
TO CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
 
Louis Fisher* 
 
Abstract 
 
As with Congress and the judiciary, presidents have access to 
powers expressly stated in the Constitution and those necessarily implied 
in those grants. In highly limited circumstances, presidents may also 
exercise a “prerogative” (i.e., unilateral action), but that authority is 
frequently misunderstood and subject to abuse. Unlike those in the other 
branches, presidents lay claim to a host of powers far beyond 
enumerated and implied powers. In seizing steel mills in 1952 to 
prosecute the war in Korea, President Harry Truman acted on what he 
called an “inherent” power that was not subject to judicial or legislative 
checks. Presidents Richard Nixon and George W. Bush relied on the 
same argument. All three presidents were rebuffed by Congress, the 
courts, and the general public. A lengthy list of other powers, all 
designed to broaden executive power beyond constitutional sources, 
include the “sole organ” doctrine; the “unitary executive”; and various 
powers called “emergency,” “plenary,” “residual,” “preclusive,” and 
“completion.” These vague categories need to be carefully analyzed to 
understand why they exceed constitutional limits and endanger self-
government and the system of checks and balances. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Presidential influence expanded after World War II in large part by asserting 
executive authority beyond powers expressly enumerated or implied in the 
Constitution. Over the past six decades, presidential studies have promoted a 
fictional and idealized model of the office, describing the President as someone 
devoted to the “national interest” and surrounded by advisers with uncanny 
* © 2014 Louis Fisher. Visiting Professor, William and Mary Law School. From 
1970 to 2010, Dr. Fisher served as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers with 
Congressional Research Service and Specialist in Constitutional Law with the Law Library 
of Congress. He thanks David Gray Adler, Reb Brownell, Henry Cohen, Neal Devins, 
Chris Edelson, Nancy Kassop, Richard Pious, Mort Rosenberg, Mitch Sollenberger, and 
Robert Spitzer for their comments and advice on this Article. Portions of this Article are 
drawn from the Author’s treatise The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power, 
published by Oxford University Press in January 2014. Some of the early sections of the 
book appear at http://books.google.com/books?id=ZbBNAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover 
#v=onepage&g&f=false.  
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expertise and political judgment.1 This Article argues that it would be 
constitutionally healthy to treat the presidency in a more realistic light and place 
greater value on the system of checks and balances. Few people idealize Congress. 
There are occasional efforts to idealize the Supreme Court as an institution with 
unrivaled competence to interpret the Constitution, but judicial errors throughout 
the last two centuries are widely known and acknowledged. The principal risk to 
constitutional government comes from conceptual mistakes about the source of 
presidential authority. Contributing to the increase of executive power is the failure 
of Congress to protect its institutional powers. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the executive and legislative 
branches’ enumerated and implied powers. Part II argues that the purported 
“inherent” presidential powers are distinct from implied powers and do not 
conform to the Constitution. Part III gives examples of presidents invoking their 
prerogative to take unilateral action. Parts IV and V argue that the Supreme Court 
has erroneously applied—and lower federal courts have confirmed—overly broad 
and defective doctrines of executive power. Part IV discusses the “unitary 
executive” doctrine; Part V discusses the “sole organ” doctrine. Finally, Part VI 
shows that presidents often overstep their constitutional powers by substituting the 
approval of international bodies for the approval of Congress when dealing with 
international disputes and military action.  
 
I.  ENUMERATED AND IMPLIED POWERS 
 
On a regular basis, the Supreme Court describes the U.S. Constitution as one 
of “enumerated powers.”2 Those announcements suggest that every power granted 
to the national government is expressly stated in the Constitution and that anything 
beyond powers specifically enumerated lacks legitimacy. In McCulloch v. 
Maryland,3 Chief Justice John Marshall instructed, “This government is 
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can 
exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is now universally admitted.”4 The 
reality, however, is that the federal government has never been limited to 
enumerated powers. All three branches require and exercise implied powers.  
The Framers fully understood the need for implied powers. James Madison 
wrote in Federalist No. 44, “No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in 
reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever 
a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing 
it is included.”5 When the First Congress debated the Bill of Rights, some 
1 Louis Fisher, Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional Office, 45 PS: 
POL. SCI. & POL. 17, 17 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 1, 2 (2012); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
3 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
4 Id. at 405. 
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 322 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 
1961). 
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lawmakers wanted to limit the national government to powers expressly delegated. 
The Articles of Confederation, which became effective in 1781, gave broad 
protection to the states, which retained all powers except those “expressly 
delegated” to the national government.6 
A member of the First Congress proposed that the Tenth Amendment limit the 
national government to powers “expressly delegated.”7 The constitutional language 
would read, “The powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”8 Madison objected to the word “expressly” because 
the functions and duties of the federal government could not be delineated with 
such precision.9 It was impracticable to confine government to express powers, for 
there “must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the Constitution 
descended to recount every minutiae.”10 Madison’s argument prevailed; lawmakers 
agreed to delete the word “expressly.”11 
Another constitutional dispute in the First Congress highlighted the need for 
implied powers. The Constitution does not give the President authority to remove 
executive officials, but lawmakers faced this question: What would happen if a 
department head was unwilling or unable to carry out a statutory duty? Could the 
President remove that individual? Legislative debate, frequently referred to as the 
“Decision of 1789,”12 occupies almost 200 pages of the Annals of Congress. 
Madison proposed the creation of three executive departments: Foreign Affairs, 
Treasury, and War. At the head of each department would be a secretary appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and removable by the 
President.13 William Smith of South Carolina opposed giving the President the sole 
power of removal.14 Madison justified the removal power as a way to make the 
President responsible for the conduct of department heads.15 Theodorick Bland 
wanted the removal power shared with the Senate to make it consistent with the 
appointment process.16 The House rejected his motion.17  
6 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. II, reprinted in MERRILL 
JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 263 (5th prtg. 1963). 
7 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761 (1789). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 
1022 (2006). 
13 Id. at 1029–30.  
14 Id. at 1030. 
15 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 387 (1789).  
16 Id. at 397. 
17 Id. For a summary of the leading arguments and the votes taken, see LOUIS FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 57–62 (6th ed. 
2014).  
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Lawmakers decided to acknowledge the President’s removal power indirectly. 
Subordinate officers would be responsible for taking charge and custody of all 
records whenever the secretary “shall be removed from office by the President of 
the United States.”18 Congressional support for the removal of department heads 
did not mean the President was at liberty to remove all subordinate executive 
officials. In debating the Treasury Department and its Office of the Comptroller, 
Madison said it was necessary “to consider the nature of this office.”19 To him, its 
properties were not “purely of an Executive nature.”20 He maintained that “they 
partake of a Judiciary quality as well as Executive.”21 Because of the mixed nature 
of the office, “there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not 
hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the Government.”22 
Although implied powers were recognized in debates over the Constitution 
and in the early years of the national government, judicial rulings continued to 
describe the Constitution as one of enumerated powers. That position is not 
credible. If the federal government is limited to enumerated powers, where did the 
judiciary receive the power of judicial review? It is not expressly provided. In 
1821, the Supreme Court decided whether Congress possessed authority to hold 
individuals in contempt, a power that does not appear in the Constitution.23 A 
unanimous Court acknowledged that within the Constitution there is not “a grant 
of powers which does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their 
exercise.”24 Without the power of contempt, Congress would be “exposed to every 
indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate 
against it.”25 
The contemporary Supreme Court continues to champion the doctrine of 
enumerated powers. In 1995, in striking down a congressional effort to regulate 
guns in schoolyards, the Court announced, “We start with first principles. The 
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”26 That is not a 
first principle. If it were, there would be no judicial authority to invalidate the 
statute. Two years later, the Court stated, “Under our Constitution, the Federal 
Government is one of enumerated powers.”27 Some powers are enumerated, but 
the federal government is more than that. In his decision in 2012 upholding the 
Affordable Care Act, Chief Justice Roberts made this claim: “If no enumerated 
power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be 
18 Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (1789). 
19 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611 (1789). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 611.  
23 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 224–25 (1821). 
24 Id. at 225–26. 
25 Id. at 228. For the implied power of federal courts to hold individuals in contempt, 
see Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924). 
26 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
27 Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
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enacted . . . .”28 Congressional power has never been limited in that manner. All 
three branches possess implied powers that can be drawn reasonably from 
enumerated powers.  
 
II.  POWERS SAID TO BE “INHERENT” 
 
Scholars at times refer to “inherent” presidential power when the more 
accurate word is implied. For example, in a study on treaties and international 
agreements, Oona Hathaway states that “the President has the power to make 
international agreements entirely on his own inherent constitutional authority. Yet 
that power is not unlimited.”29 The very definition of inherent power is that it 
inheres in an office and therefore is not subject to limits. She explains that 
limitations are not supplied by international law but by domestic law, and in the 
United States, “the central source to which we must turn is the U.S. Constitution, 
which is the source of both the President’s unilateral international lawmaking 
authority and the limits thereon.”30 In other words, the authority is a mix of express 
and implied powers, not inherent powers. 
Some scholars treat implied powers and inherent powers as the same.31 They 
are quite different. Implied powers are drawn reasonably from express powers. 
They are therefore anchored in the Constitution. By definition, inherent powers are 
not drawn from express powers. As the word suggests, they consist of powers that 
“inhere” in a person or an office. Black’s Law Dictionary has defined inherent 
power in this manner: “An authority possessed without its being derived from 
another . . . . [P]owers over and beyond those explicitly granted in the Constitution 
or reasonably to be implied from express grants.”32 Inherent power is clearly set 
apart from express and implied powers. 
The Constitution is protected when presidents act under express and implied 
powers. It is at risk when they claim inherent powers. A constitution protects 
individual rights and liberties by specifying and limiting government. Express and 
implied powers serve that purpose. Inherent powers invite claims of authority that 
have no limits other than those voluntarily accepted by the President. What 
“inheres” in the President? At times the word “inherent” is cross-referenced to 
“intrinsic,” which can be something “belonging to the essential nature or 
construction of a thing.”33 What is in the “nature” of a political office and 
“essential” to it? Nebulous words and concepts encourage unilateral presidential 
actions that lack constitutional authority and endanger individual liberties. Inherent 
powers move the nation from one of limited powers to boundless and ill-defined 
28 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 1, 3 (2012). 
29 Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the 
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 210 (2009). 
30 Id. at 211. 
31 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 20, 430 (2008).  
32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979). 
33 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 614 (10th ed. 1965). 
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authority, undermining republican government, the doctrine of separation of 
powers, and the system of checks and balances.34  
Presidents who claimed inherent powers have been turned back by Congress, 
the courts, or both: Truman trying to seize steels mills in 1952 to prosecute the war 
in Korea, Richard Nixon impounding appropriated funds and ordering warrantless 
domestic surveillance, and George W. Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attacks claiming 
the right to unilaterally create military tribunals without first obtaining authority 
from Congress. 
 
A.  Truman’s Steel Seizure 
 
On April 8, 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10340, 
authorizing and directing the secretary of commerce to take possession of eighty-
seven steel plants, facilities, and other property of private companies “as he may 
deem necessary in the interests of national defense.”35 He acted to avert a 
nationwide strike of steel companies. The executive order referred to “American 
fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations . . . now 
engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea.”36  
On April 17, a reporter at a news conference asked, “Mr. President, if you can 
seize the steel mills under your inherent powers, can you, in your opinion, also 
seize the newspapers and/or the radio stations?”37 President Truman responded, 
“Under similar circumstances the President of the United States has to act for 
whatever is for the best of the country. That’s the answer to your question.”38 
Public opinion turned against this definition of presidential power. Newspapers 
across the country warned that “dictatorial powers” were “dangerous,” “ugly,” 
“fear-inspiring,” and “a constitutional and political crisis.”39 
Several steel companies took the dispute to federal district court. Holmes 
Baldridge of the Justice Department defended the steel seizure as “a legal taking 
under the inherent executive powers of the President.”40 For constitutional 
authority he cited the “executive power” that Article II vests in the President, the 
Take Care Clause, the Commander in Chief Clause, and “that [the President] shall 
34 See Louis Fisher, Invoking Inherent Powers: A Primer, 37 PRES. STUD. Q. 1, 1–2 
(2007) [hereinafter Invoking Inherent Powers]; Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and 
Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569, 586–90 (2010) [hereinafter The 
Unitary Executive]. 
35 Exec. Order 10340, 3 C.F.R. 861, 862 (1949–1953).  
36 Id. at 861. 
37 The President’s News Conference of April 17, 1952, 98 PUB. PAPERS 269, 272–73 
(Apr. 17, 1952). 
38 Id. 
39 98 CONG. REC. 4033–34 (1952). 
40 The Steel Seizure Case, H.R. DOC. NO. 534, pt. 1, at 253 (1952). This document 
contains proceedings in district court and the D.C. Circuit. 
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be the sole organ of the nation in its external relations.”41 Judicial misconceptions 
about the sole-organ doctrine are covered in Part V.  
In district court, Baldridge told Judge David A. Pine that the court had no 
authority to rule against the President: “Our position is that there is no power in the 
Courts to restrain the President . . . .”42 Baldridge agreed that the government was 
not asserting any statutory power. Instead, the President’s power was based on 
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article II “and whatever inherent, implied or residual powers 
may flow therefrom.”43 He recognized only two limitations on the President: “One 
is the ballot box and the other is impeachment.”44 Emphasizing how earlier 
presidents had successfully invoked “inherent” power,45 Baldridge concluded his 
argument with two more references (for a total of eleven) to presidential inherent 
power.46 
On April 29, Judge Pine ruled against President Truman’s action in seizing 
the plants. He found no express or implied constitutional authority for the seizure. 
No “residuum of power” or “inherent” power, he said, existed to justify this 
exercise of emergency power for the good of the public.47 To Judge Pine, the scope 
of presidential power described by Baldridge “spells a form of government alien to 
our Constitutional government of limited powers.”48 
On May 3, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument on 
May 12. Solicitor General Philip Perlman, presenting the case for the executive 
branch, did not refer one time to “inherent presidential power.”49 On June 2, by a 
6–3 vote, the Supreme Court struck down President Truman’s executive order.50 
The majority consists of the opinion by Justice Black,51 followed by concurrences 
from Justices Frankfurter,52 Douglas,53 Jackson,54 Burton,55 and Clark.56 All six 
Justices rejected the claim of inherent presidential power in this instance.57 Chief 
Justice Vinson, joined by Justices Reed and Minton, defended President Truman 
41 Id. at 255. 
42 Id. at 362. 
43 Id. at 371. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 386. 
46 See id. at 426–27. 
47 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 573 (D.D.C. 1952). 
48 Id. at 576. 
49 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) 877–995 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). With other parties, the Justices debated 
the existence of inherent presidential powers. E.g., id. at 986–94. 
50 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952). 
51 Id. at 582–89.  
52 Id. at 593–628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
53 Id. at 629–34 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
54 Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 655–60 (Burton, J., concurring). 
56 Id. at 660–67 (Clark, J., concurring).  
57 See supra notes 51–56.  
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but largely on the basis of legislatively approved policies, treaty obligations (the 
UN Charter), and military appropriations.58  
 
B.  Nixon’s Impoundments 
 
“From [1789] forward, Presidents were not required to spend every dollar that 
Congress appropriated. Some appropriation accounts were purely discretionary, 
such as contingency funds. Presidents had no obligation to spend all the money.”59 
An early precedent, cited by the Nixon administration in 1973 to justify its 
ambitious impoundment policy,60 was the decision by President Thomas Jefferson 
in 1803 to withhold $50,000 for gunboats.61 However, there was no controversy. 
He explained to lawmakers that the Louisiana Purchase made it unnecessary to 
immediately spend the money.62 He took time to study the most recent models of 
gunboats and later informed Congress that he was implementing the program.63  
Some impoundments challenge the ability of Congress to set national policy 
and decide budget priorities. House Appropriations Chairman George Mahon 
remarked in 1949 that members of Congress did not object to any reasonable 
economies in government: “But economy is one thing, and the abandonment of a 
policy and program of the Congress another thing.”64 From 1940 through the 
1960s, presidents collided with Congress by refusing to spend appropriated funds, 
with many impoundments affecting military programs.65 Impoundments continued 
during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, but political 
accommodations resolved the disputes.66  
The Nixon administration ratcheted up the stakes.67 On January 31, 1973, 
President Nixon claimed that the “constitutional right for the President of the 
United States to impound funds—and that is not to spend money, when the 
58 Id. at 667–72 (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
59 LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 237 
(2014); see also Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s 
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 27–30 (2001). 
60 Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings Before the 
Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations & the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 676–77 
(1973) (statement of Joseph Cooper, Professor) [hereinafter Impoundment Hearings]. 
61 FISHER, supra note 59, at 237. 
62 Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message (Oct. 17, 1803), in 1 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 345, 348 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
63 Id. at 360. For a discussion of the historical background to President Jefferson’s 
action, see Impoundment Hearings, supra note 60, at 676–77. 
64 95 CONG. REC. 14922 (1949) (statement of Rep. Mahon). 
65 See Brownell II, supra note 59, at 38, 42–45. 
66 Id. 
67 See JAMES P. PFIFFNER, THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET, AND CONGRESS: 
IMPOUNDMENT AND THE 1974 BUDGET ACT 40–44 (1979); Louis Fisher, Funds Impounded 
by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 125–26 (1969); 
Louis Fisher, Impounded Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 141 (1973). 
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spending of money would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes for all 
the people—that right is absolutely clear.”68 He vowed not to spend money “if the 
Congress overspends.”69 Officials in his administration claimed that impoundment 
was consistent with the President’s “constitutional authority in the area of foreign 
affairs, his role as Commander in Chief, and his constitutional duty to ‘take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.’”70 Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed 
insisted that the President’s constitutional powers to impound funds find their 
source not only in the Take Care Clause and his “express status as Commander-in-
Chief” but as the “sole organ of the Nation in the conduct of its foreign affairs.”71  
The Nixon administration repeatedly invoked President Jefferson’s 
withholding of funds for gunboats as a legitimate precedent. Questioned by a 
Senate committee on impoundment actions, Housing and Urban Development 
Secretary George Romney replied, “I guess Thomas Jefferson started this.”72 
Actions by Presidents Jefferson and Nixon were worlds apart. President Jefferson 
delayed spending money but eventually purchased gunboats to carry out statutory 
policy. President Nixon claimed the constitutional right to cut programs in half and 
eliminate them altogether. The severity of those reductions prompted dozens of 
lawsuits, with the administration losing almost all of them.73 
Both houses worked on impoundment control bills. Title X of the Budget Act 
of 1974 created two categories of impoundment: “rescissions” (actions to terminate 
funds) and “deferrals” (proposals to delay spending).74 Congress prohibited 
presidents from cancelling a program unless Congress specifically granted its 
approval by statute.75 For deferrals, lawmakers agreed that Congress could 
disapprove by something short of a public law.76 The choice of legislative action 
was a one-house veto.77 The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha struck 
down the legislative veto and thus invalidated the one-house veto for deferrals.78 
However, the D.C. Circuit, in a later decision, ruled that the one-house veto was 
tied inextricably to the deferral authority.79 If one fell, so did the other. The 
68 The President’s News Conference of January 31, 1973, 1 PUB. PAPERS 53, 62 (Jan. 
31, 1973). 
69 Id. 
70 Impoundment Hearings, supra note 60, at 271 (statement of Roy Ash, Director-
Designate, Office of Management and Budget).  
71 Id. at 369 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
72 Department of Housing and Urban Development; Space, Science, Veterans, and 
Certain Other Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973: Hearings on 
H.R. 15093 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong. 565 (1972) 
(statement of Sec’y George Romney). 
73 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 177, 189–201 (1975). 
74 Id. at 199; Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-344, § 1011(3)–(4), 88 Stat. 297. 
75 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 1012. 
76 Id. § 1013. 
77 Id. 
78 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
79 City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 906–09 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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President’s authority to make policy deferrals thus disappeared. Only routine, 
nonpolicy deferrals are permitted. Congress promptly converted the judicial ruling 
into statutory policy.80 
 
C.  Nixon’s Domestic Surveillance 
 
 On June 5, 1970, President Nixon met with the heads of several intelligence 
agencies, including the National Security Agency (NSA), to initiate a program 
designed to monitor what the administration considered radical individuals and 
groups in the United States, particularly opponents of the Vietnam War.81 What 
became known as the Huston Plan directed the NSA to use its technological 
capacity to intercept—without judicial warrant—the communications of U.S. 
citizens using international phone calls or telegrams.82 Under pressure from FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover, President Nixon withdrew this plan.83  
However, the NSA had been targeting domestic groups for several years and 
continued to do so.84 The Huston plan, kept in a White House safe, became public 
in 1973 after Congress investigated the Watergate affair and discovered that 
President Nixon had ordered the NSA to illegally monitor American citizens.85 To 
conduct its surveillance operations, the NSA entered into agreements with U.S. 
companies, including Western Union and RCA Global.86 U.S. citizens, assuming 
their telegrams were strictly private, learned that American companies had been 
turning them over to the NSA.87 
In 1972, a district court expressly dismissed the claim of a broad “inherent” 
presidential power to conduct domestic surveillances without a warrant.88 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s argument that the power at issue 
“is the inherent power of the President to safeguard the security of the nation.”89 
Unanimously, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit and held that the 
Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval for surveillances of domestic 
organizations.90  
80 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Affirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-119, § 206, 101 Stat. 785. 
81 JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY 430 (2002). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 430–31. 
84 Id. at 431. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 434–38. 
87 Id. at 438–39. 
88 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
89 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 444 F.2d 651, 658 (6th 
Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 318–21 
(1972). 
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Building on those decisions, Congress passed legislation to provide statutory 
policy for the President’s power to conduct surveillance over foreign powers. The 
result was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.91 The 
assertion of inherent presidential power now faced a judicial check. FISA 
established a special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to ensure 
independent supervision of executive power. FISA made clear that the statutory 
procedures for electronic surveillance within the United States for intelligence 
purposes “shall be the exclusive means” for conducting such surveillance.92 
 
D.  Bush’s Military Tribunal 
 
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued a military order to 
create military tribunals to try individuals who gave assistance to the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11.93 The administration justified the order on the ground of 
presidential inherent power.94 As with claims by other presidents, Bush’s assertion 
of inherent power would fail.  
The constitutionality of President Bush’s action reached the Supreme Court in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.95 It held that President Bush’s military order violated both 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.96 Congress had 
enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and it was the President’s duty to 
comply with it. No inherent presidential authority existed to circumvent statutory 
policy. In this litigation, I filed three amicus briefs to oppose the Bush 
administration: when the case was with the D.C. Circuit, when a motion had been 
filed for certiorari, and after the Court granted certiorari.97  
To the Bush administration, founding-era history justified independent 
presidential power to create military tribunals: “When the Constitution was written 
and ratified, it was well recognized one of the powers inherent in military 
command was the authority to institute tribunals for punishing enemy violations of 
the law of war” and that General Washington had appointed a Board of General 
91 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.). 
92 Id. § 201(f). For more contemporary issues on electronic surveillance, see Louis 
Fisher, National Security Surveillance: Unchecked or Limited Presidential Power?, in 
CONTEMPORARY CASES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 378–408 (Ralph G. Carter ed., 5th ed. 
2014). 
93 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
94 See Fisher, Invoking Inherent Powers, supra note 34, at 12. 
95 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
96 Id. at 557–58. 
97 Brief for Louis Fisher as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184); Brief for Louis Fisher as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner [Commissions—History], Hamdan v. Rumfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) 
(No. 05-184) (on writ of certiorari); Brief for Louis Fisher as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner-Appellee, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d. 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5393). 
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Officers in 1780 to try British Major John André as a spy.98 The Justice 
Department asserted that “there was no provision in the American Articles of War 
for court-material proceedings to try an enemy for the offense of spying.”99 
Those arguments were in error. As my briefs explained, the Continental 
Congress adopted a resolution in 1776 expressly providing that enemy spies “shall 
suffer death . . . by sentence of a court martial, or such other punishment as such 
court martial shall direct,” and ordered the resolution “be printed at the end of the 
rules and articles of war.”100 A year earlier, Congress made it punishable by court 
martial for members of the Continental Congress to “hold correspondence with” or 
“give intelligence to” the enemy.101 The Bush administration displayed little 
understanding of history by relying on the John André trial of 1780. There was no 
President at that time. There was no separate executive branch. There was only one 
branch of government: the Continental Congress. In convening Major André’s 
trial, Washington did not act unilaterally as an executive possessing inherent power 
but as a military general carrying out procedures established by Congress. Other 
military tribunals were created after 1789, raising important questions about 
presidential power and judgment.102  
 
III.  INVOKING THE PREROGATIVE 
 
Inherent power is at times associated with the prerogative power: an 
independent executive power to act in a time of emergency. They are quite 
different. Under inherent power, the President claims authority to act without any 
interference from other branches. The prerogative accepts that the executive may at 
times take the initiative, but only with the understanding that the President 
recognizes he is not acting under the law and will need Congress to approve his 
action.  
President Jefferson exercised the prerogative when he decided to exceed the 
instructions of Congress in purchasing territory from France. After receiving 
legislative authority to pay as much as $10 million for New Orleans and the 
Floridas, he learned that Napoleon Bonaparte was prepared to sell all of Louisiana 
because he needed money to fight Great Britain. On April 30, 1803, France ceded 
the vast territory of Louisiana for $15 million. The Senate approved the Louisiana 
98 Brief for Respondents at 58, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-
184) 2006 WL 460875 at *21. 
99 Id. 
100 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 693 (1776). 
101 American Articles of War of 1775, art. XXVIII, in WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY 
LAW AND PRECEDENTS 955 (2d ed. 1920); see also Brief for Louis Fisher as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner [Commissions—History], supra note 97, at 19 n.6. 
102 See generally LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005) (reviewing the history of 
military tribunals in the United States and the use of military justifications to expand 
presidential power in time of war, at the cost of legislative and judicial control). 
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treaties, and the United States took possession of 828,000 square miles, doubling 
the size of the nation.103  
President Jefferson never claimed authority to act as he did. He wondered if a 
constitutional amendment might be required.104 Instead of fabricating a strained 
constitutional theory to justify his action, he asked Congress for legal support and 
received it. Particularly because of the “constitutional difficulty,” he thought it 
might be best for Congress to engage in “as little debate as possible.”105 In a letter 
to Attorney General Levi Lincoln, President Jefferson decided that a constitutional 
amendment was not necessary or advisable: “the less that is said about any 
constitutional difficulty, the better; and that it will be desirable for Congress to do 
what is necessary, in silence.”106  
John Yoo, in a study of executive power from George Washington to George 
W. Bush, stated that President Abraham Lincoln “never invoked the 
prerogative.”107 Actually, the initiatives taken by President Lincoln at the start of 
the Civil War are best described as exercising the prerogative. In a separate study, 
Yoo said that when President Lincoln raised an army, withdrew money from the 
Treasury Department, and launched a blockade on the South, he acted “on his own 
authority.”108 That is not correct. President Lincoln recognized that he did not have 
constitutional authority to act as he did. For that reason, he was required to go to 
Congress and seek retroactive authority.  
When Congress returned on July 4, 1861, President Lincoln explained the 
emergency actions he had taken, including raising an army and withdrawing 
money from the Treasury. Clearly those powers are vested exclusively in Congress 
by Article I. President Lincoln’s admission that he acted outside the law was clear 
when he told lawmakers he believed his actions were not “beyond the 
constitutional competency of Congress.”109 In other words, he acknowledged using 
both Article I and Article II powers. In this manner he relied on the following 
103 See generally ALEXANDER DECONDE, THIS AFFAIR OF LOUISIANA (1976) 
(documenting the chronological history of the Louisiana Purchase and its correlation with 
the ideology of expansionism in the Jeffersonian era.); MARSHALL SPRAGUE, SO VAST SO 
BEAUTIFUL A LAND: LOUISIANA AND THE PURCHASE (1974) (discussing the political, 
economic, and social factors that led to the Louisiana Purchase).  
104 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 410–11 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. 
eds., 1903); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), 
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-john-c-breckinri 
dge/. 
105 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 418; Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in LIBERTY AND ORDER: THE 
FIRST AMERICAN PARTY STRUGGLE 310 (Lance Banning ed., 2004). 
106 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 417.  
107 JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM 
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 426 (2009). 
108 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 114 (2006). 
109 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3225 (James 
D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
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prerogative: the need in an emergency to act in the absence of law and sometimes 
against it, with the requirement that he seek statutory authority from the legislative 
branch. Congress passed legislation that “approved and in all respects legalized 
and made valid, to the same intent and with the same effect [all the acts, 
proclamations, and orders of the President, etc.] as if they had been issued and 
done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the 
United States.”110 
The destroyers-for-bases deal of 1940 is sometimes described as an example 
of presidential prerogative and even the exercise of inherent authority. In a 
message to Congress on September 2, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
announced he had entered into an agreement to transfer fifty “over-age” destroyers 
to Great Britain in return for receiving ninety-nine-year leases to a number of 
British air and naval bases in North and South America.111 Robert Shogan’s book 
Hard Bargain carries this subtitle: How FDR Twisted Churchill’s Arm, Evaded the 
Law, and Changed the Role of the American Presidency. It is an insightful study, 
but the theme of illegality that pervades the book is never substantiated. Nowhere 
does Shogan identify a law that Roosevelt evaded or violated.  
The key law that Shogan discusses in some detail—the Walsh Amendment—
was complied with in full. Signed by Roosevelt on June 25, 1940, the amendment 
provided that no U.S. military or naval weapon or equipment be transferred, 
exchanged, sold, or otherwise disposed of unless the chief of naval operations and 
the chief of staff of the Army “first certif[ied] that such material [was] not essential 
to the defense of the United States.”112 When Roosevelt sent his message to 
Congress announcing the destroyers-for-bases deal, he forwarded several papers, 
including the certification by Admiral Harold Stark.113 
 
IV.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
 
Scholars offer varying accounts on what is called the Vesting Clause. Article 
II, Section 1 begins, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”114 What is the scope of that power? Does it include 
powers specifically identified in the Constitution augmented by necessary implied 
powers? Or is the “executive Power” a source of power that goes beyond 
enumerated and implied powers? Some scholars, such as Steven Calabresi and 
Kevin Rhodes, read the Vesting Clause to empower the President to exercise 
exclusive control over the executive branch, creating a “Unitary Executive” that 
110 Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 316, 326 (1861); see Louis Fisher, 
Abraham Lincoln: Preserving the Union and the Constitution, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 503, 
528 (2010). 
111 86 CONG. REC. 11354, 11354 (1940). 
112 An Act to Expedite National Defense, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 76-671, 
§ 14(a), 54 Stat. 676, 681 (1940). 
113 86 CONG. REC. 11354–57 (1940). 
114 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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cannot be limited by Congress through means such as statutory provisions that 
restrict the President’s power to remove executive officials.115 
This interpretation is too broad because the President’s removal power was 
restricted from the beginning. In 1789, when Congress created the Office of 
Comptroller in the Treasury Department, it established an executive official who 
did not serve at the pleasure of the President; instead, that official exercised an 
independent capacity to ensure the legality of expenditures.116 Moreover, the 
nature of U.S. government places certain agency actions beyond presidential 
control. That is especially true when statutory duties are vested with particular 
executive officers (“ministerial” actions), during agency adjudication, and during 
the rise of independent agencies.117 The Constitution does not empower the 
President to carry out the laws—that would impose an impossible assignment. 
Instead, the President’s duty is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”118 Many decisions remain legitimately outside the President’s direct 
control, provided officials discharge their statutory tasks.119 It would be 
impermissible for presidents or White House aides to interfere with judgments by 
executive officials regarding veterans’ benefits, social security payments, and 
many other matters left to the departments and agencies assigned those statutory 
duties.120  
In Marbury v. Madison,121 Chief Justice Marshall drew an important 
distinction between two types of executive duties, ministerial and discretionary.122 
With the latter, the heads of executive departments function purely as political 
agents of the President, and courts will not interfere.123 But executive officers also 
receive legal duties assigned to them by Congress. Focusing on the secretary of 
state, Chief Justice Marshall said when the office exercises ministerial duties, it 
extends to the nation and the law.124 By statutory command, Congress may direct 
executive officers to carry out certain activities. When a secretary of state performs 
115 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1992). 
116 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611–14 (1789). 
117 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 1346, 1347–49 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106–19 (1994); Morton 
Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise 
and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 627, 636–37 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587–
91 (1984).  
118 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
119 See Fisher, The Unitary Executive, supra note 34, at 574–78.  
120 Id. at 576. 
121 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
122 Id. at 162. 
123 Id. at 165–66. 
124 See id. at 149–50. 
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“as an officer of the United States,” he or she is “bound to obey the laws.”125 
Functioning in that capacity, the secretary acts “under the authority of law, and not 
by the instructions of the president. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on 
a particular officer for a particular purpose.”126 
Many opinions issued by attorneys general and federal courts have analyzed 
ministerial/legal duties. In 1823, Attorney General William Wirt advised President 
James Monroe about the scope of his control over agency accounting officers.127 
The laws regulating the settlement of public accounts required auditors in the 
Treasury Department to receive and examine accounts, and certify them to the 
comptrollers, who then examined them and reached a judgment.128 Although the 
Constitution requires the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,” Wirt said the President is not expected to execute each law by 
himself.129 If officers under his supervision fail to carry out their duties, the 
President needs to see they are “displaced, prosecuted, or impeached.”130 But it 
“could never have been the intention of the constitution, in assigning this general 
power to the President to take care that the laws be executed, that he should in 
person execute the laws himself,” a demand Wirt called “an impossibility.”131  
If auditors and comptrollers “continue to discharge their duties faithfully,” the 
President “has no authority to interfere.”132 Any person dissatisfied with the 
comptroller’s decision may, under law, appeal within six months.133 At that point, 
“the right of appeal stops; there is no proviso for an appeal to the President.”134 In 
subsequent years, Wirt had frequent occasion to instruct President Monroe that he 
had no business being involved in the settlement of accounts.135 He said that 
interference by the President “in any form would, in my opinion, be illegal.”136 It 
“would be an unauthorized assumption of authority for [the President] to interfere 
in the case in any manner whatever.”137 Two opinions by Wirt in 1825 reinforced 
that conclusion.138  
In 1831, Attorney General Roger Taney advised President Andrew Jackson 
that a dispute over the decision of the Treasury Department about a government 
contractor must be left to Congress. An appeal could not be submitted to the 
125 Id. at 158. 
126 Id. 
127 The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1823). 
128 Id. at 626–27. 
129 Id. at 624. 
130 Id. at 625. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 624. 
133 Id. at 627. 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g., The President and the Comptroller, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 636 (1824). 
136 The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 678, 680 (1824). 
137 Id. at 681. 
138 The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 705 (1825); The 
President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 706 (1825). 
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President. The power to provide relief “resides in Congress; and to them, in my 
opinion, the application must be made.”139 Other attorneys general have provided 
the same advice to presidents.140 
Litigation requiring officials in the administration to comply with statutory 
duties are generally directed at the heads of executive departments.141 They can 
also be aimed at the President. In 1974, an appellate court held that President 
Nixon had violated the law by refusing to carry out a statute designed to regulate 
federal pay. It was his obligation either to submit to Congress a pay plan 
recommended by the salary commission or offer an alternative proposal. President 
Nixon failed to do either. The court said the law required him to do one or the 
other. President Nixon had no constitutional authority to ignore statutory policy.142 
 
V.  SOLE-ORGAN DOCTRINE 
 
In the 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision, Justice Sutherland included extraneous 
material to develop the doctrine that the President is the “sole organ” of foreign 
affairs and has a range of constitutional authority that is exclusive and plenary.143 
The doctrine seems to come with impressive credentials. It relies on a speech given 
in 1800 by John Marshall when he served in the House of Representatives.144 A 
year later he became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.145 Yet Chief Justice 
Marshall never took the position that Justice Sutherland attributed to him. Justice 
Sutherland’s argument is not only mere dicta. It is also plain judicial error. 
In defending the secret warrantless surveillance program that President Bush 
authorized after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in violation of the FISA statute of 
1978, the Justice Department relied in part on the sole-organ doctrine. It claimed 
that the activities by the NSA “are supported by the President’s well-recognized 
inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and sole organ for the 
139 Duties of Accounting Officers—Forfeitures, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 480, 482 (1831). For 
similar opinions by Taney, see Accounts and Accounting Officers, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 
508–09 (1832); Appeals from Accounting Officers, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 544, 544–45  (1832).  
140 See, e.g., Eight-Hour Law, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 685 (1890); Charwin Land Grant, 18 
Op. Att’y Gen. 31 (1884); Patent Extensions, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 28 (1869); Appeal of 
Illinois to the President, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 14 (1864); Rotation of the President to the 
Departments, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 527 (1863); Bollman’s Case, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 526 (1863); 
Office and Duties of Att’y Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 341 (1854); Power of the President 
Respecting Pension Cases, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515, 516 (1846).  
141 See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. 
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1938); United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); 
Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973). 
142 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 590–91, 604 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
143 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936).  
144 Id. at 319–20. 
145 CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 7 (1996). 
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Nation in foreign affairs.”146 It might have been “well-recognized” by some Justice 
Department attorneys, but it has not been by anyone who has taken time to read 
Marshall’s speech.  
The issue in Curtiss-Wright involved legislative, not presidential, power: How 
much may Congress delegate its power to the President in the field of international 
affairs? In upholding the delegation, Justice Sutherland claimed that the principle 
that the federal government is limited to enumerated and implied powers “is 
categorically true only in respect to our internal affairs.”147 In arguing for 
independent and exclusive presidential powers in the field of foreign affairs, 
Justice Sutherland relied on Marshall’s speech. 
What Justice Sutherland and the Justice Department failed to understand is 
Marshall’s purpose in giving his speech. Marshall never advocated inherent, 
plenary, exclusive, or independent powers for the President in foreign affairs.148 
Some members of the House of Representatives wanted to censure or impeach 
President John Adams for turning over to England a British subject charged with 
murder. In his floor address, Marshall explained why no grounds existed to 
sanction President Adams. The Jay Treaty provided for extradition in cases 
involving the charge of murder. President Adams acted not on the basis of plenary 
or inherent power but on express language in a treaty, with treaties under Article 
VI of the Constitution included as part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”149 He 
was not making foreign policy independently. He was carrying out national policy 
decided by both elected branches. 
Reviewing his service as secretary of state and Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, it is apparent that Marshall never advanced any notion of inherent, plenary, 
exclusive, or independent powers of the President in external affairs. As Chief 
Justice, he looked solely to Congress in matters of war.150 Marshall understood that 
when a conflict arose between what Congress provided by statute and what a 
President announced by proclamation, in time of war, the statute represents the law 
of the nation.151 
146 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to the Majority Leader of the 
U.S. Senate, on Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security 
Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc 
/opiniondocs/nsa-white-paper.pdf. 
147 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316. 
148 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 613 (1800). 
149 U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. For greater detail on Marshall’s speech, see Louis 
Fisher, Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 PRES. STUD. Q. 139 
(2007) and Louis Fisher, Study No. 1: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, in STUDIES ON 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN RELATIONS (L. Libr. Cong., 2006-03236) [hereinafter 
The “Sole Organ” Doctrine], available at http://www.loufisher.org/docs/pip/441.pdf.  
150 See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (“The whole powers of war 
being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can 
alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry.”). 
151 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–79 (1804) (holding that a 
proclamation issued by President Adams during the Quasi-War was invalid because it 
conflicted with a congressional statute). 
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Although Justice Sutherland’s dicta is clear judicial error, federal courts 
continue to cite the sole-organ doctrine to uphold broad definitions of presidential 
power in foreign relations and support extensive delegations of legislative power to 
the President.152 Lower court judges, Supreme Court Justices, and their law clerks 
appear never to read Marshall’s speech to form an independent and informed 
judgment. The Supreme Court in 1972 described the President as authorized “to 
speak as the sole organ” of the national government.153 Authority to speak is not 
equivalent to exclusive authority to make or formulate foreign policy.  
A contemporary example of a court relying on the sole-organ doctrine to 
promote exclusive presidential power occurred on July 23, 2013. The D.C. Circuit 
ruled that congressional legislation in 2002 “impermissibly intrudes” on the 
President’s power to recognize foreign governments.154 The statute required the 
secretary of state to record “Israel” as the place of birth on the passport of a U.S. 
citizen born in Jerusalem if the parent or guardian so requests.155 Four times the 
court cited Justice Sutherland’s dicta in Curtiss-Wright describing the President as 
the “sole organ” in external affairs.156  
In citing Curtiss-Wright and other rulings, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged it 
was relying on judicial dicta. Citing language from one of its decisions in 2006, it 
stated, “To be sure, the Court has not held that the President exclusively holds the 
power [of recognition]. But, for us—an inferior court—‘carefully considered 
language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be 
treated as authoritative.’”157 There are two qualifiers: carefully and generally. 
Justice Sutherland’s dictum was manifestly careless. 
There is no doubt the Supreme Court regularly cites the sole-organ doctrine in 
Curtiss-Wright, but no matter how often the Court repeats an error, it remains an 
error and should not be used as an authoritative source to decide constitutional 
issues. An error, by repetition, does not emerge as truth. Instead of endlessly 
repeating errors, federal judges and the Supreme Court should take time to read 
Marshall’s speech and correct Justice Sutherland’s misrepresentation.158 It may be 
embarrassing to admit that a Supreme Court decision issued in 1936 and cited 
regularly as valid authority over the decades is nonetheless wrong. Failure to do so, 
however, would reveal a Court willing to rest comfortably on faulty precedents. 
152 See, e.g., Fisher, The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, supra note 149, at 23–27. 
153 First Nat’l City Bank. v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 n.2 (1972) 
(citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937)). 
154 Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
155 Id. at 200. 
156 Louis Fisher, Getting It Wrong Again and Again—Judicial Error’s Compounding 
Effect, NAT’L L. J., Nov. 18, 2013, at 31, 31. 
157 Zivotofsky, 725 F.3d at 212 (citation omitted). 
158 See Louis Fisher, Judicial Errors that Magnify Presidential Power, FED. LAW., 
Jan./Feb. 2014, at 66–72; Louis Fisher, D.C. Circuit Court Adopts Old Judicial Error to 
Inflate Executive Power, ROLL CALL (Sept. 13, 2003, 2:31 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/n 
ews/dc_court_adopts_old_judicial_error_to_inflate_executive_power_commentary-227606 
-1.html. 
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VI.  EXTERNAL SUBSTITUTES FOR CONGRESS 
 
From 1789 to 1950, presidents who wanted to take the country from a state of 
peace to a state of war knew the Constitution required them to come to Congress to 
obtain either a declaration or authorization.159 That understanding radically 
changed in June 1950 when President Harry Truman went to war against North 
Korea without seeking congressional authority. President Truman did so by citing 
“authorization” not from Congress but from the United Nations Security Council. 
His precedent in circumventing Congress—and the Constitution—has been 
followed by other presidents, including George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and 
Barack Obama. In addition to accepting the Security Council as a substitute for 
Congress, presidents also falsely claim “authorization” from NATO allies. 
The constitutional issue can be appreciated by asking a series of questions. 
May a treaty amend the Constitution? No. May a President and the Senate through 
the treaty process (as with the UN Charter and NATO) create an international or 
regional body that functions as a constitutional substitute for Congress? No. May a 
treaty transfer the Article I authority of Congress to an organization outside the 
United States? Again: No. 
Under the UN Charter, each nation enters into “special agreements” to 
commit troops and other military assistance to a UN force. On July 2, 1945, from 
Potsdam, President Truman sent a cable to Senator Kenneth McKellar, who placed 
it in the Congressional Record. The cable stated, “When any such agreement or 
agreements are negotiated it will be my purpose to ask the Congress for 
appropriate legislation to approve them.”160 President Truman thus made a public 
commitment that he would not act unilaterally but would seek advance support 
from both houses of Congress through a bill or joint resolution.  
Chapter VII of the UN Charter governs UN responses to threats of peace, 
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. Special agreements concluded between 
the Security Council and member states “shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”161 
Each nation therefore needed to determine its “constitutional processes.” 
Parliamentary regimes might be inclined to vest that decision in the prime minister. 
The United States had to decide its constitutional requirements.  
After the Senate ratified the UN Charter, Congress debated the meaning of 
“constitutional processes” for the United States. Section 6 of the UN Participation 
Act, enacted on December 20, 1945,162 authorized the President to negotiate a 
special agreement with the Security Council, “which shall be subject to the 
approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution,” providing for the 
numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, 
159 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 23–26, 32–44, 51–54, 65–67, 74–79 
(3d ed. 2013). 
160 91 CONG. REC. 8185 (1945). 
161 U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 3. 
162 United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945). 
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and other requirements.163 Presidents could commit armed forces to the United 
Nations only after Congress explicitly granted its approval by statute.164 
 Other limits on presidential authority to involve American troops in UN 
military operations were included in amendments to the UN Participation Act in 
1949. The statute permitted the President to unilaterally provide military forces to 
the United Nations “for cooperative action,” yet this discretionary authority faces 
stringent limitations. U.S. troops serve only for “peaceful settlement of disputes 
and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter . . . .”165 They could serve only “as observers, guards, 
or in any noncombatant capacity, but in no event shall more than a total of one 
thousand of such personnel be so detailed at any one time.”166 Nothing in the text 
or legislative history of the UN Charter, the UN Participation Act, or the 1949 
amendments authorized unilateral presidential decisions to commit U.S. troops to 
an offensive action without prior congressional approval.  
With statutory safeguards supposedly in place to protect congressional powers 
and constitutional government, President Truman on June 26, 1950, spoke to the 
American public about “unprovoked aggression [by North Korea] against the 
Republic of Korea.”167 He said the Security Council ordered a withdrawal of the 
invading forces to positions north of the 38th parallel.168 At that point, President 
Truman did not commit U.S. forces to the conflict. A day later, however, after 
North Korea failed to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th parallel, he ordered 
U.S. air and sea forces to assist South Korea.169 
A July 3 memo by the State Department offered legal justifications for 
unilateral presidential exercises of military force, including, “The President, as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control 
over the use thereof.”170 From 1789 to 1950, no President argued that this clause 
empowered him to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. The 
memo identified “many instances” where armed force was used by presidents to 
protect American lives and property.171 None of the examples involved offensive 
military operations against another country.  
In addition to relying on Security Council resolutions as a means of 
authorizing military operations, presidents turned to NATO allies to sanction 
163 Id. § 6, 59 Stat. at 621 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287d (2012)). 
164 Id. 
165 Act of Oct. 10, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81–341, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 734, 735 (codified as 
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1(a) (2012)). 
166 Id. § 7(a)(1), 63 Stat. at 736. 
167 Statement by the President on the Violation of the 38th Parallel in Korea, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 491 (June 26, 1950). 
168 Id. 
169 Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, 1 PUB. PAPERS 492 (June 27, 
1950); see also GLENN D. PAIGE, THE KOREAN DECISION: JUNE 24–30, 1950, at 178 (1968). 
170 Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP’T STATE BULL. 
173, 173 (1950). 
171 Id. at 174–78. 
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armed force against other nations. The same issue of defining “constitutional 
processes” under Article 43 of the UN Charter applies equally well to language in 
mutual-defense treaties. The NATO treaty was signed in 1949 by the United 
States, Canada, and ten European countries.172 Article 5 provides that “an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all.”173 It further states that, in the event of an attack, NATO 
countries may exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized 
by Article 51 of the UN Charter and assist the country or countries attacked by 
taking “such action as it deems necessary,” including use of armed force.174 Article 
11 of the treaty provides that it shall be ratified “and its provisions carried out by 
the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”175 
Mutual security treaties may not constitutionally transfer the war-making 
power from Congress to the President, acting through such organizations as 
NATO. Moreover, mutual security treaties were entered into for defensive 
purposes. President Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo, and President Obama in Libya, 
used NATO military forces against countries that did not attack or threaten the 
United States.176 The operations were offensive, not defensive. Mutual security 
treaties require action through “constitutional processes.”177 Unilateral offensive 
wars by the President lack any constitutional support. 
By providing that the NATO treaty be carried out in accordance with 
constitutional processes, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “intended to 
ensure that the Executive Branch of the Government should come back to the 
Congress when decisions were required in which the Congress has a constitutional 
responsibility.”178 The treaty “does not transfer to the President the Congressional 
power to make war.”179 Congress reinforced that constitutional principle with 
section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.180 It provides that authority to 
introduce U.S. forces into hostilities shall not be inferred “from any treaty 
heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation 
specifically authorizing” the introduction of American troops.181 
As with President Truman, President George H. W. Bush claimed that a 
resolution from the UN Security Council provided sufficient constitutional 
authority to use military force against Iraq. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait 
172 NATO, NATO IN FOCUS 11 (2013), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoliv 
e/topics_81135.htm.  
173 North American Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 25–29. 
177 Id. 
178 Richard H. Heindel et al., The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate, 
43 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 649 (1949). 
179 Id. at 650; see also Michael J. Glennon, United States Mutual Security Treaties: 
The Commitment Myth, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509, 517–18 (1986). 
180 Id. at 543. 
181 War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 8(a)(2), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012). 
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on August 2, 1990, President Bush sent several hundred thousand troops to Saudi 
Arabia and the Middle East for defensive purposes.182 His decision in November to 
double the size of U.S. forces enabled him to wage offensive war.183 He made no 
effort to seek authority from Congress.  
Instead, the administration sought support from the United Nations to take 
offensive action against Iraq. On November 29, 1990, at the urging of the Bush 
administration, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing member 
states to use “all necessary means” to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.184 Thomas 
Franck, a specialist in international law, wrote an article for The New York Times 
entitled Declare War? Congress Can’t.185 In his view, once the Security Council 
acts, member states have no grounds to wait and seek authority from their 
legislatures.186 Franck’s position is not supported by the language “constitutional 
processes” in the UN Charter, the legislative history of the Charter, the text of the 
UN Participation Act, or the U.S. Constitution. 
On January 8, 1991, President Bush asked Congress to pass legislation 
supporting his use of the military. When questioned by reporters the next day 
whether he needed a statute from Congress, he replied, “I don’t think I need it. . . . 
I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations 
resolutions.”187 Congress passed legislation authorizing offensive action against 
Iraq. In signing the bill, Bush claimed he could act without statutory authority:  
 
As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for 
congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, 
constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive 
branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed 
Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War 
Powers Resolution.188  
 
His signing statement did not alter the fact that the resolution passed by Congress 
authorized him to act. Law depends on what a signed bill provides, not what a 
President says about it.  
President Clinton circumvented Congress several times by citing “authority” 
from the United Nations and NATO. On July 31, 1994, the Security Council 
182 Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to 
Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at A1. 
183 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-B-254380, NAT’L SEC. & INT’L 
AFFAIRS DIV., REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT 
MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE 1 (1993). 
184 S.C. Res. 678, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
185 Thomas M. Franck, Declare War? Congress Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at 
A27. 
186 Id. 
187 Exchange With Reporters on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1 PUB. PAPERS 20 (Jan. 9, 
1991). 
188 Id. at 40.  
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adopted a resolution authorizing all member states, particularly those in the region 
of Haiti, to use “all necessary means” to remove the military leadership on that 
island.189 On this occasion, the Senate spoke promptly and clearly by passing a 
“sense of the Senate” amendment, stating that the Security Council resolution 
“does not constitute authorization for the deployment of United States Armed 
Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the United States or pursuant to the War 
Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).”190 The nonbinding amendment passed, 
100 to 0.191 
On September 15, in a nationwide televised address, President Clinton 
announced he was prepared to use military force against Haiti “to carry out the will 
of the United Nations.”192 He made no such commitment to the will of the United 
States or requirements of the U.S. Constitution. An invasion became unnecessary 
when former President Jimmy Carter helped negotiate an agreement to have the 
military leaders in Haiti step down.193 House and Senate debates were strongly 
critical of President Clinton’s belief that he could act militarily against Haiti 
without statutory authority. Both houses passed legislation stating the “the 
President should have sought and welcomed Congressional approval before 
deploying United States Forces to Haiti.”194  
In 1993, President Clinton claimed legal support from both the Security 
Council and NATO to order air strikes in Bosnia. As he explained the next year, 
“The authority under which air strikes can proceed, NATO acting out of area 
pursuant to U.N. authority, requires the common agreement of our NATO 
allies.”195 Through his reasoning, it was necessary to obtain approval from France, 
Italy, and other NATO allies, but not from Congress. On September 12, 1995, 
President Clinton claimed the bombing attacks were “authorized by the United 
Nations.”196 Toward the end of 1995, Clinton ordered twenty thousand American 
ground troops to Bosnia. On no occasion did he request or receive statutory 
authority for these military operations.197 
189 Julia Preston, U.N. Authorizes Invasion of Haiti; Resolution Adds Pressure on 
Generals, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1994, at A1. 
190 140 CONG. REC. 19306-24 (1994). 
191 Id. 
192 William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti: September 15, 1994, II PUB. 
PAPERS 1558, 1559 (1994). 
193 See Ann Devroy, Clinton Halts Invasion as Haiti Leaders Agree to Quit; U.S. 
Forces Land Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1994, at A1. 
194 140 CONG. REC. 28239 (1994) (passing S.J. Res. 229); id. at 28565–78 (passing H. 
J. Res. 416). A day later the House, by voice vote, agreed to S.J. Res. 229. Id. at 29223–24. 
195 William J. Clinton, Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia: 
February 6, 1994, I PUB. PAPERS 183, 186 (1994). 
196 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents, II PUB. PAPERS 1353 (1995). 
197 FISHER, supra note 159, at 185−91; RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON WARS 
73−77 (2002). 
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By October 1998, Clinton was threatening the Serbs with air strikes on the 
basis of NATO authority.198 He did not request statutory support from Congress. 
The House and Senate took several votes on concurrent resolutions, but such votes 
have no legal value and cannot provide statutory authorization. Various votes were 
taken but did not become law.199 The war against Yugoslavia began on March 24, 
1999, without any statutory or constitutional support.  
In 2001 and 2002, President George W. Bush received advance authority from 
Congress for the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq.200 In 2011, President Obama 
continued the pattern of initiating military action against another country without 
congressional authorization. Although Libya had not threatened the United States 
in any manner, he cited “authorization” from the Security Council to bomb air 
defense systems and Libyan forces as part of a no-fly zone policy.201 Later, 
President Obama and administration officials spoke of receiving “authorization” 
from NATO allies.202 President Obama was the first President to conduct offensive 
military operations beyond the ninety-day limit of the War Powers Resolution, 
eventually stretching to seven months. 
The administration concluded that the military operations did not constitute 
“war” or “hostilities.”203 An Office of Legal Counsel memo, in April 2011, argued 
that in order to meet the constitutional meaning of war there had to be “prolonged 
and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military 
personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”204 According to that 
interpretation, a nation with superior military force could pulverize another 
country—including through the use of nuclear weapons—and there would be 
neither war nor hostilities. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Federal courts continue to rely on judicial precedents that were false when 
first issued and continue to lack legitimacy. A prominent example is Justice 
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PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 176, 180 (2012). 
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Office of Legal Counsel, on the Authority to Use Military Force in Libya 8 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
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Sutherland’s misleading account in Curtiss-Wright of the President as “sole organ” 
in external affairs, explained in Part V above. Although it is a favorite citation by 
courts, executive officials, and scholars to promote plenary, independent, 
exclusive, and inherent power for the President, nothing in John Marshall’s speech 
provides any support for that position. A judicial error should not guide 
constitutional interpretation. 
It is well known that courts frequently err when citing precedents. Justice 
Jackson observed in 1945, “Judges often are not thorough or objective 
historians.”205 More recently, in 1989, Justice Scalia stated that the judicial system 
“does not present the ideal environment for entirely accurate historical inquiry.”206 
Relying on the experience with his own staff, he said courts do not “employ the 
ideal personnel.”207 In addition, in a book published after he left the Court, Justice 
John Paul Stevens, observed that “judges are merely amateur historians” whose 
interpretations of past events “are often debatable and sometimes simply 
wrong.”208 Even with these limitations, if federal judges want to rely on Marshall’s 
sole-organ speech in 1800, they should take the time to read it and reach an 
independent judgment. Simply repeating erroneous dicta is irresponsible. 
In the Steel Seizure case of 1952, Justice Jackson objected to “nebulous, 
inherent powers never expressly granted but said to have accrued to the 
[presidential] office from the customs and claims of preceding administrations.”209 
He added, “Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much 
legal discussion of presidential powers. ‘Inherent’ powers, ‘implied’ powers, 
‘incidental’ powers, ‘plenary’ powers, ‘war’ powers and ‘emergency’ powers are 
used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings.”210 
Contemporary scholars have added other supposedly independent presidential 
powers: “residual,” “preclusive,” “completion,” the “sole organ” doctrine, and the 
“unitary executive.” 
Those vague and often historically false assertions attempt to inflate 
presidential power beyond the only legitimate sources of authority: enumerated 
and implied. When properly understood, on very rare occasions a President may 
exercise a prerogative power. For the last six decades, many scholars have 
advanced theories of presidential power that exaggerate executive virtues and pay 
little or no attention to presidential violations of public law, basic principles of 
republican government, separation of powers, and constitutional checks and 
205 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the 
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1945). 
206 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 861 
(1989). 
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209 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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balances.211 Other presidential scholars have effectively rejected this impulse for 
hagiography.212 
From World War II to the present, Congress has demonstrated little interest in 
protecting and comprehending its institutional powers, developing policy, 
exercising oversight of the executive branch, and fighting off encroachments by 
other branches.213 From Harry Truman to Barack Obama, presidents repeatedly 
claim the right to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war without 
seeking authority from Congress. Unconstitutionally, they go to war by citing 
approval from the UN Security Council and NATO. 
211 For studies on the pronounced academic bias that promotes presidential power, see 
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